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Abstract—Stream deinterleaving is an important problem with
various applications in the cybersecurity domain. In this paper,
we consider the specific problem of deinterleaving DNS data
streams using machine-learning techniques, with the objective of
automating the extraction of malware domain sequences. We first
develop a generative model for user request generation and DNS
stream interleaving. Based on these we evaluate various inference
strategies for deinterleaving including augmented HMMs and
LSTMs on synthetic datasets. Our results demonstrate that
state-of-the-art LSTMs outperform more traditional augmented
HMMs in this application domain.
Index Terms—DNS, Deinterleaving, LSTM, Malicious Domain
Detection
I. INTRODUCTION
Deinterleaving temporal data streams is a general machine-
learning problem with important applications to security and
privacy. Specifically, interleaved network data streams are a
common occurrence in cyber-threat monitoring which compli-
cates many analyses. In many instances, the individual stream
identifiers are unavailable due to technical challenges, such
as the vantage point of the data collector or are intentionally
supressed to protect the privacy of users in the network.
For example, consider packet traces collected in a local
area network where the source IP addresses are removed, or
data collected from the external-facing interface of a proxy
server, or a NAT firewall where individual client identifiers are
unavailable. Detecting anomalous behavior, especially stealthy
and low-volume attack patterns, in these aggregated noisy
streams is significantly more challenging than in a traditional
deinterleaved setting.
In this paper, we discuss a variant of this problem, i.e.,
deinterleaving client request streams from recursive DNS
resolvers to mine threat intelligence. Such DNS data streams
are shared among Internet service providers (ISPs) through
mediums such as the Security Information Exchange (SIE) [6]
and are a valuable source of intelligence to the cybersecurity
community. Here, the individual client requests to the recursive
DNS resolver are typically suppressed and what we have are
inter-resolver communications (i.e., communications between
the recursive resolver and the root server, TLD servers and
other secondary resolvers). We are interested in the application
of advanced machine-learning techniques to automate the
extraction of malware domain groups [6] from such resolver
streams.
Malware infections while browsing the Internet have be-
come very prevalent and occur due to various reasons such as
drive-by exploits, phishing attacks etc [15], [17]. In a typical
infection, the user starts from a landing page and then goes
through a sequence of seemingly harmless intermediate web-
sites, until reaching a site that contains the malicious exploit
that harm the user by installing malware or stealing private
data. The intermediate sites are typically redirection chains im-
plemented in JavaScript for the purpose of obfuscation. Even
though many landing and exploit websites are continously
identified and blacklisted, thousands of new malicious domains
emerge daily. However, pieces of the redirection infrastructure
get reused across campaigns and thus the actual sequence of
websites traversed by the user contains information that may
help in quickly identifying new exploit sites.
When a user makes a browser request to visit a website, it
first resolves the domain name by asking its recursive resolver.
If the answer for the query is cached by the resolver the answer
is immediately provided to the client. Otherwise, it initiates a
set of recursive queries, leading to the final queried website’s
IP address. Each webpage may have several embedded objects
from many domains leading to a sequence of domain lookup
requests emanating from the client. Tracking the set of DNS
requests made by each client is thus a useful means to
identifying new and emergent malware infection sequences.
However, to protect user privacy ISPs typically only capture
data from the external facing interface of the recursive resolver,
effectively suppressing the individual client stream identifiers.
As there are hundreds of users making requests at the same
period of time, and all of these requests are pushed to a single
queue of a local DNS resolver, we cannot tell apart individual
user’s sequences of requests and perfectly deinterleaving all re-
quests for deanonymization purposes is impossible. However,
our objective is not deanonymization, but rather extraction
of malware domain sequences which are observed repeatedly
across resolvers. We believe that advanced machine learning
strategies could be in such selective deinterleaving of DNS
time-series for the extraction of malware domain groups.
Prior Work. To the best of our knowledge deinterleaving
has not been applied to DNS resolver queue’s data. Some
earlier work [6] investigates the use of a sliding window
approach to identify new malicious domains by exploring the
domains that typically form neighbors of known malicious
domains in the resolver queue, while ignoring the actual
sequential information. The challenges of applying existing
deinterleaving methods to DNS data is twofold. First, most
of the methods has been designed for deinterleaving Markov
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chains [2], [12]–[14] and HMMs [10], and as we will discuss
in Section II, the dynamics of submitting new queries to
the local resolver is more complicated than simple Markov
chain or HMM. Moreover, the state space of the models and
number of sequence sources are very small in previous work
applications [10], [12], while in our application, huge number
of websites explodes the size of state space and also tens of
users may be active in a network simultaneously. Because of
the nature of our dataset, we need to use tools other than those
adopted in literature [3], [4], [10], [12].
Another very useful model for time-series is Recurrent
Neural Networks (RNN). Recently, RNNs and their variants
(Gated Recurrent Units (GRUs) [5], Long Short-Term Memory
(LSTMs) [8]) have seen a lot of success in modeling time-
series in multiple domains [1], [7], [16]. However, to our
knowledge even simple RNN tools have not been applied to
the deinterleaving problem. Using RNN-type tools for deinter-
leaving mixed DNS request logs is a completely unexplored
area. Motivated by the power of LSTMs to model non-linear
dependencies, we seek to apply LSTMs to such data and start
a new direction of work towards identifying newer malicious
domains more efficiently.
Contributions. This paper presents a preliminary explo-
ration of the utility of various machine-learning models to
address the time series deinterleaving problem for malware
domain group extraction. Specifically, we present a model
for DNS request generation and resolver-sequence interleaving
and evaluate the utility of various inference strategies on sy-
thetic examples including Augmented Hidden Markov Models
(AHMMs) and LSTMs finding that LSTMs outperform AH-
MMs. Extending this analysis to real and large-scale datasets
is future work.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A user starts by visiting a page e.g., a.com. While
launching the webpage, many queries are being generated
from different components of that browsed webpage: a.com,
ad1.com, audio1.org. In another scenario a webpage
can redirect the user to a sequence of other pages and
generate sequence of requests. We refer to this sequence as
a query episode. Next, when the user opens a new web-
site another episode is started. The same process generates
query sequences for other users. For example, a second user
generates: b.com, ad2.com and after the interleaving we
may observe the following sequence in the resolver:b.com,
a.com, ad1.com, ad2.com, audio1.org. We call
this process request interleaving. Our goal is to deinterleave
the two request sequences.
A. User’s Request Generation Model
The browsing process of a user can be modeled as simple
as a Markov chain (MC) of webpages, an HMM, or an HsMM
model. Figure 1 illustrates these three different user model. We
model the browsing process described above using a Hidden
Semi-Markov Model (HsMM). MC and HMM are special
cases of this process. The hidden layer of the HsMM consists
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Fig. 1: User’s browsing models.
of random variables W representing the browsed webpages.
Note that pages are hidden because what we see are only the
DNS requests.
The page transition matrix is different for each user and
is represented by the matrix Pu. The observed state of the
HsMM is the domain name request R which will be put in
the resolver queue. Note that the time between subsequent
browsed pages (which is equal to the time spend in a page
before moving to the next one) in reality is different from
the duration parameter in our model. In real world data, each
user spends an interval on a page but in our model since we
are only interested in the order of queries, we only count the
number of requests that the page will query from the resolver
and represent it by the random variable D. So the duration
parameter D represents the number of outstanding requests
from the current page.
Fig 1c shows the details of the model and Table I sum-
marizes the model parameters. Ou(w, r) is the probability of
submitting (outputting/observing) request r on the webpage
w, for the user u. Conditional probabilities of the model are
as follows:
Pu(w|w′, d′) =
{
[Pu]w′w d
′ = 1
δ(w,w′) d′ > 1
,
Pu(d|w, d′) =
{
pw(d) d
′ = 1
δ(d, d′ − 1) d′ > 1 ,
Pu(r|w) = [Ou]w,r ,
(1)
The duration parameter cannot be zero, when d = 1 (i.e., the
page’s last request is submitted) and the user moves to another
page which resets the duration using pw(d). The duration
probability pw(d) determines the number of requests that the
webpage w will query and is independent of user u.
B. Resolver’s Sequence Interleaving Model
Each time step in our model is a slot in the resolver’s queue.
Since there cannot be two requests in the same slot, only one
user out of m can fill the t-th slot of the queue. Considering
the frequency of request generation, we assume that each user
i has a probability of αi to generate the t-th request where∑m
i=1 αi = 1. So if a user is very active it has higher αi and
submit requests more often.
In a more complicated setting, one can model the the “turn”
of m users as a Markov chain. We name the transition matrix
of the user’s Markov chain as A = [αij ] ∈ Rm×m. Therefore
the probability of user j generating the t-th request from the
i-th user is P(U(t) = j|U(t − 1) = i) = αij . The random
Symbol Explanation
W RV for the webpage
D RV for the number of requests to be issued on a page
R RV for the issued DNS request
m Number of users
n Total number of pages
q Maximum number of requests per page
Pu ∈ Rn×n Webpage transition matrix of the user u
pw(d), d ∈ [q] Distribution of number of requests d on the page w
Ou ∈ Rn×n Output distribution matrix of the user u
TABLE I: Summary of the model parameters and random
variables (RV). For each random variable the corresponding
small letter represents a realization. Note that W and D
depend on the user but to avoid cluttering we omitted the
index u.
variable U(t) ∈ [m] represents the active user that generated
the t-th request of the resolver queue. As mentioned above,
a simplified variant of the user’s transition matrix A is the
shares vector α that has been used in literature [2], [12] where
∀i, j : P(U(t) = i|U(t− 1) = j) = αi.
To distinguish each user’s corresponding HsMM random
variable in the interleaving process we use both user index
and time index. For example, Wk(t) is the user k’s current
webpage. Note that here the time is different from the real
world time and HsMM duration that discussed in Section II-A.
Time here is just an index into the resolver’s sequence of
queries. For example, Wk(t) shows the webpage of user k
when the tth request was submitted to the resolver.
We model the interleaving process as an Augmented Hidden
Markov Model (AHMM), where the hidden states are aug-
mented states, i.e., combination of variables [12]. To make
the equations more readable, we lump together the variables
corresponding to each user and make the following lumped
variable Lk(t) = (Wk(t), Dk(t)) and the hidden state of the
HMM becomes H(t) = (L1(t), . . . , Lm(t), U(t)) which is a
2m + 1 dimensional vector. Fig 2 illustrates the interleaving
process that leads to sequence generation. For simplicity, we
assume u(t − 1) = u′ and u(t) = u which means that users
u′ and u are active at time steps t − 1 and t respectively.
At the time step t, user u(t) = u ∈ [m] generates the request
v(t) which is the observed (visible) variable of the HMM. The
request v(t) is determined by the next request of the user in its
HsMM model, i.e., ru(t). Therefore, the emission probability
of the AHMM is:
P(V (t) = v(t)|H(t) = h(t)) = Pu(ru(t)|wu(t)) = Ou(wu(t), ru(t)).
Now we derive the entries of the transition probability matrix
of the AHMM:
P(H(t)|H(t− 1)) = αu′u
m∏
k=1
P(lk(t)|lk(t− 1), u), (2)
In the case of k 6= u the user k is not active, i.e., stalled.
Substituting the probability distributions from (1), we get:
P(lk(t)|lk(t− 1), u) =

k 6= u δ(w,w′)δ(d, d′)
k = u
{
d = 0 pw(d)[Pu]w′w
d > 0 δ(d, d− 1)
(3)
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Fig. 2: Illustration of the interleaving process. The random
variable u selects the user that generates the query for the
time step t and stalls the others. The selected user proceed
according the user model, HsMM, and outputs the query v.
Symbol Explanation
L The lumped random variable L = (W,D).
H The hyper-hidden state of the HMM H = (L1, . . . , Lm, U).
V The visible state of the HMM which is the requested DN.
TABLE II: Summary of the augmented variables. For each
random variable the corresponding small letter represents a
realization.
III. DEINTERLEAVING METHODS
In the deinterleaving problem, given {v(t)}Tt=1 we are
interested in inferring {u(t)}Tt=1. In other words, we want to
find the users who initiated each request from the sequence
generated by the interleaving process described in Section
II-B.
We present two candidate approaches for inference. One is
based on reducing the interleaving process to an AHMM as
discussed in Section II-B. This approach has been used for
deinterleaving of Markov chains with small number of chains
(users) and state space [12]. Next, we propose to deinterleave
using an LSTM model which have recently been shown to
perform well in many time-series analysis tasks [5], [8].
A. Inference on Augmented HMM
We can model the whole interleaving process as an AHMM
and use learning techniques (like EM) to learn its parameters
and use Viterbi inference to determine the most probable
hidden (augmented) states h(t) from which we can extract the
most probable user u(t). The main difficulty of applying this
framework is that the state space of hidden variable, Figure
1, is very large. More specifically, there are m(nq)m possible
states of h and as we increase number of webpages n or users
m the state space grows exponentially. The huge state space,
makes the inference and learning very hard and as we show in
Section IV-A for synthetic experiments, even when the model
parameters are known, deinterleaving performs (using Viterbi
coding) poorly.
B. Inference using an LSTM
RNNs [11] are popular for modeling time series data. Given
the input vt and hidden state ht−1, the RNN computes the
next hidden state representation ht and output ut using the
following recurrent relationships
ht = f(Wvvt +Whht−1 + b) (4)
ut =Wuht (5)
where Wv , Wh, Wu and b are the network parameters, and
f() is some non-linear function. An example of f could be a
sigmoid f(z) = σ(z) = 1/(1 + exp(−z)) or rectified linear
unit f(z) = max(0, z).
For our specific problem of deinterleaving, an RNN can
by posed as a multi-class classification problem, where the
input is the observed webpage and the output will be the
identified user who requested that webpage. Specifically, each
data instantiation consists of a sequence of user-request pairs,
i.e., (u(t), v(t)). This represents who was the user at a given
time t and what request was produced by that user. Both the
user and the request are represented by an integer. The RNN is
unrolled for the entire length of one sequence. The users and
request integers are converted to one-hot encoding to enable
learning. Thus if there are b possible web pages, the requests
become b-dimensional vectors and for m users, it becomes an
m-dimensional vector. The request vectors are fed as input
to the RNN model, while the output is the corresponding
user at each time-step. The RNNs m-dimensional output is
passed through a softmax layer to convert it into probabilities
and the user with higher probability is compared against the
ground truth. Performance is measured in terms of accurately
identifying the user at each instant.
A common variant of RNN is LSTM [8] which we use in
our experiments. We randomly initialize network parameters
Wv,Wh,Wu and apply stochastic gradient descent (SGD) (for
RNNs, it is also referred to as a Backpropagation-through-
time (BPTT) algorithm). In particular, we use a variation
of the standard SGD called Adam [9], which allows for
adaptive learning rates using the past gradients, similar to
using momentum. This results in faster convergence compared
to other adaptive algorithms.
IV. EXPERIMENT
We start with a synthetic toy example and compare our
LSTM algorithm with Viterbi inference as the baseline and
then move to larger experiments. In all experiments, accuracy
is measured as 1T
∑T
t=1 1(ut = uˆt) where ut is the actual user
generated query t and uˆt is the inferred user.
A. Viterbi vs. RNN
Here we generate synthetic resolver queue using the most
complicated user model, i.e., HsMM of Figure 1c and report
the Viterbi and LSTM methods performance. To reduce the
computational burden for the Viterbi algorithm, we restrict
ourselves to 2 pages, 2 users, and 2 possible requests per page.
To make the setup even simpler, user i browse only page i
Method Viterbi LSTM
Mean Accuracy 0.51 0.92
Std of Accuracy 0.02 .17
TABLE III: Comparing accuracy of Viterbi coding and LSTM
methods for the toy example. Results are averaged over 5
realization of the synthetic data. The baseline accuracy based
on the proportion of users α = (.4, .6) is .6.
Parameter Value
m 2 users
n 20 pages
q Maximum of 5 request per page
α (0.4, 0.6)
A Diagonal dominated row stochastic random matrix∗.
Pu A random 20× 20 matrix∗
pw(d) Uniform(1, 5)
Ou A random 20× 20 matrix∗
TABLE IV: Summary of the experimental setup for the
synthetic experiment IV-B. ∗More on the random matrix
generation in the text.
and page i picks from two possible requests at random using
Beta(3+,1+δ) where  and δ are independent and uniform over
[0, 1]. Viterbi is tested on the same sequences of size thousand.
Results are averaged over 5 realizations of the synthetic data.
With this setup the size of the hidden state space of the AHMM
built from the HsMM user model is 32 and the number of
observations is 2. The users shares vector is α = (.4, .6).
LSTM is trained, validated and tested with sequences of size
6, 3, 1 thousands requests, respectively.
Table III summarizes the result: Interestingly, LSTM out-
performs Viterbi by a large margin. Note that we perform
Viterbi assuming that HMM parameters are given and not
learned from data using algorithms like Baum–Welch, and
even with this setup Viterbi performs poorly, worst that the
baseline. Perhaps, the poor performance of Viterbi compared
with LSTM can be explained by the linear nature of Viterbi
coding and the intrinsic power of LSTM in learning non-linear
temporal relations.
B. Synthetic Experiment
Owing to the poor performance of AHMM approach from
now on we focus on LSTM method of Section III-B. We report
the results of seven synthetic experiments only for LSTM
which is trained, validated and tested with sequences of size
60, 30, 10 thousands requests, respectively.
We test the results for 7 different scenarios, in all of them we
want to deinterleave a sequence generated by two users but the
parameters in each experiment is set up differently. Table IV
specifies the shared parameter setup. Specific user transition
and emission matrices are set for different scenarios which
are explained in Section IV-B. Note that in our experiments
we report results on two set of synthetic data set, where in
one we have a users shares vector α determining the share of
each user from the queue’s requests. In the other more general
data generating scheme, we assume that the users transition
10
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(b) Case 2
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10
10
10 non-zero elements, 
each = 1/10
(c) Case 3
Fig. 3: Illustration of the disjoint surfing categories for a = 10
and b = 20.
matrix A governs the turn in request submission. Different
distributions for α and A are discussed in Section IV-B.
Sparsity Patterns of Matrices: For each user u we have
two matrices Pu and Ou which are randomly generated. The
generation process assumes that each row of both matrices is
sparse, which is a reasonable assumption. Each user view and
surf a limited number of pages and on each page the possible
requests are from a small subset of the all available pages. The
supports of Pis and Ois can overlap or be disjoint and this
combination generates the different setups of our experiments.
After selecting a support we generate a discrete distribution
over that support, which will be discussed in Section IV-B.
In the following the outer-list determines the different
strategies for generating Pus and the inner-list elaborates the
method of building Ous. Each row of Ous has a non-zero
elements (randomly selected) and the distribution is uniform.
We call O1 6= O2 and O1 = O2 schemes, personalized and
shared outputs respectively.
• Disjoint webpage surfing: In this scenario, users surf
disjoint parts of the web, say user 1 surf inside a group
of first a pages and user 2 surf the remaining n−a pages,
Fig 3.
Case 1) Disjoint personalized outputs - same group-
ing as webpages: Ou and Pu have similar sparsity
patterns, Fig 3a.
Case 2) Disjoint personalized outputs: Ou and Pu
do not have similar sparsity patterns, but support of
O1 and O2 are disjoint, Fig 3b.
Case 3) Shared output: Fig 3c.
• Overlapped webpage surfing with fixed block size:
Each user selects its surfing support of size a at random.
Supports may overlap, Fig 4.
Case 4) Personalized outputs: Fig 4a.
Case 5) Shared output: Fig 4b.
• Overlapped webpage surfing with variable block size
and interaction between blocks: Each user selects
s = Uniform(1, a) pages at random as its main support
(higher probability of surfing in these s pages), and a−s
pages again at random as its auxiliary support (pages that
user seldom visits), Fig 5.
Case 6) Personalized outputs: Fig 5a.
Case 7) Shared output: Fig 5b.
Probability Distributions: Here we explain different dis-
tributions used in our synthetic generator:
10 non-zero elements, 
each = 1/10
Overlapped 
Surfing
10
10
(a) Case 4
Overlapped 
Surfing
10
10
20
10 non-zero elements, 
each = 1/10
(b) Case 5
Fig. 4: Illustration of the overlapped surfing without auxiliary
block for a = 10 and b = 20.
Main block
Auxiliary 
block
10 non-zero elements, 
each = 1/10
(a) Case 6
Main block
Auxiliary 
block
10 non-zero elements, 
each = 1/10
(b) Case 7
Fig. 5: Illustration of the overlapped surfing with auxiliary
block for a = 10 and b = 20.
• Users shares vector α: We fix α to (.4, .6).
• Rows of user transition matrix A(u): This is a diagonal
dominant matrix, meaning that if user u has submitted the
current request v(t) it is more probable that he submit the
next request. In this way, we capture the fact that because
of the episodic nature of the request submission, close-by
queries are more probable to come from a same user. This
has been exploited in the previous literature [6]. Note that
when instead of matrix A we only consider the vector α
we may not capture this realistic property of the data. For
the toy example, we set αii = .5 + 12Uniform(0, 1) and∀i 6= j : αij ∝ (1− αii)Uniform(0, 1)
• Rows of output matrix Ou(w): As mentioned before,
each row Ou(w) has a non-zero elements with each with
probability 1/a.
• Rows of page transition matrix Pu(w): In a nutshell, we
discretize a continuous Beta distribution with different
parameters for each block and normalize the final vector.
The distribution that we use for the (main) support is
Beta(3+,1+δ) where  and δ are random numbers from
[−1, 1]. For the distribution on the auxiliary support of
the cases 6 and 7 above, we use Beta(2+,2+δ).
Discussion: Table V shows the error of our method for all
7 cases of Section IV-B for a = 10.
Each row is the average result for five instantiation of the
model parameters Ou and Pu. The error of each instantiation
(each row) is an average of 100 experiments. Note that case 1
and 2 are trivial cases when both Ps and Os are disjoint and
LSTM perfectly dis-interleave. Interestingly, performance in
case 3 is much worse than cases 1 and 2, which confirms
Cases 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
α
Mean 1 1 .63 .70 .62 .74 .65
Std 0 0 .02 .02 .02 .05 .04
A
Mean 1 1 .77 .69 .67 .82 .78
Std 0 0 .10 .09 .08 .09 .16
TABLE V: Deinterleaving accuracy of LSTM for different
cases of the synthetic example when user transitions are
determine by either of α = (.4, .6) or random diagonally
dominant A. The baseline for α and A experiments are .6
and .5 respectively.
that in our model having disjoint output matrices is more
important than disjoint surfing pattern. Intuitively, this makes
sense because the final request comes from the output matrices
and if we have personalized outputs the deinterleaving should
be easier. Interestingly, beyond the trivial cases 1 and 2, case
6 has the best accuracy, probably because of personalized
outputs and more complicated Pu for each user (composed
of main and auxiliary block) makes the whole problem more
separable.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper describes our foray into the application of
advanced deep-learning techniques to the problem of dein-
terleaving DNS-based time-series sequences. To this end, we
developed an HsMM-based model of user request generation
and an AHMM-based model of the interleaving process at the
resolver queue. We then evaluated the efficacy of two different
inference strategies for deinterleaving on a synthetic dataset.
Our results suggest that LSTM-based strategies significantly
outperform traditional AHMM-based models. In future work,
we plan to extend this analysis on signficantly larger datasets
to the specific problem of malware domain group extraction.
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